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ARTICLES
BROWSE-WRAPS, CLICK-WRAPS AND
CYBERLAW: OUR SHRINKING
(WRAP) WORLD
Michael Dessent1
I. INTRODUCTION
"Dear Prof. Abby:
Last week I was called by my telephone carrier who wanted
to know if I would agree to contract with them for high speed
internet service. After listening to their sales pitch, I said that I
would. Following a series of questions about compatibility with
my computer, she then asked me if she could record my voice as
the "signature" of my assent. I said it was okay. Then she asked
me whether I agreed to the terms, telling me that I must speak
the words, "I agree." She then recorded my verbal assent! Now,
I'm not sure if I want the service after all. Am I stuck?
Searchingly yours,
BROWSER-MOUSE"
"DEAR BROWSER-MOUSE: Welcome to the digital age!
Not to sound cheesy, but if you aren't current with the internet,
you might become road-kill on the information superhighway -
so congratulations! Yes, you're contractually bound - even with-
out signing any writing!
Professor Abby"
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS
Whether by a click of a button, email or thumbprint, busi-
nesses are offering unique ways to bind consumers in the world
of e-commerce. Professors Arthur Corbin and Samuel Williston
must be rolling over in that big law school in the sky.
Within the last year, online purchases were close to one half
a billion dollars. It is estimated that by the year 2004, such sales
1. Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, California Western School of Law; B.S.
Northwestern University, 1964; J.D., cum laude, Northwestern University School of
Law, 1967.
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will reach $3.2 trillion.2 The popularity of internet sales and con-
tracts is largely due to the cost effectiveness and speed of trans-
acting online. This profound rise in electronic transactions has,
predictably, called for legislation that would protect consumers
against fraud, respect conflicting state and federal laws and per-
mit a high level of security online. Possible? Let's see:
This area of the law recently was referred to as a potential
"litigation nightmare." 4 Others call the new statutes lawyers'
"retirement acts" for the several reasons addressed below. This
paper will describe the different laws governing digital transac-
tions, the issue of federal or state law preemption, conflicts of
laws, dilemmas regarding fraud and security and where public
policy burdens should fall in electronic transactions.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAWS
A. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Remember one of your favorite topics in law school, the
Statute of Frauds?5 Prior to the recent adoption of the federal E-
Sign Act,6 courts could not readily accept electronic signatures or
computer transactions as binding contractual events in large part
because of the limitations of the Statute.7
For example, if there is a sale of goods, Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code requires "some writing sufficient to indi-
cate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought for
2. Jonathan E. Stern, Note, Federal Legislation: The Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 391 (2001).
3. Mike Watson, Note, E-Commerce and E-Law, Is Everything E-Okay? Analysis
of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 53 BAYLOR L.
REV. 803, 806 (2001).
4. P. Reed, Consumers at Risk: A Litigation Nightmare with Electronic Signature
Laws, (October 24, 2000) available at http://law.about.com/library/weekly/aa
102400a.htm. (Author maintains article on file.)
5. See e.g. U. C. C. § 2-201 (2002).
6. The Electronic Signatures in Global and Natural Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7001-7006 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Roos v. Aloi, 487 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that
an oral agreement by stockholders in a close corporation to be executed over ten
years violated the one year limit in the Statute of Frauds); see also PMC v. Saban
Entm't, 45 Cal.App.4th 579 (1996) (explaining that in a breach of contract claim, the
agreement is unenforceable if it does not satisfy the requirement of a signed writ-
ing), and Phillippe v. Shappel Indus., 43 Cal.3d 1247, (Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that
an oral commission agreement is invalid).
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the sale of goods for $500 or more."'8 (Recent attempts to in-
crease this minimum to $10,000 have failed.) The Statute of
Frauds also would have barred electronic transactions (if it could
have anticipated them) if performance of the contract would
have exceeded one year from the date of making.9
As the popularity of online transactions grew, 10 states began
to recognize the need for comprehensive and uniform laws gov-
erning electronic transmissions." Additionally, the Statute of
Frauds needed to be amended to allow for electronic
signatures. 12
In 1995, Utah was the first state to enact a law that regulated
digital transactions. 3 This early statute was based on a technol-
ogy-specific approach which gave only "digital signatures" legal
enforceability. 4 By comparison, California's early law adopted a
technology-neutral stance on signatures.15
In an effort to provide consistency among the state laws, in
1999 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted the Uniform Electronic Transac-
tions Act (UETA).16 UETA basically states that an electronic
signature is valid when coupled with the signer's intent to au-
thenticate the "record." 17
UETA deals with the validity of electronic transactions, at-
tributes an electronic record to a person, resulting in changes and
errors in transactions and requires electronic transactions to be
retained in hard copy for reference. 8 UETA is technology neu-
tral; that is, it does not specify which type of security feature or
encryption will be legally binding. 9 Given the rapidly changing
8. U. C. C. § 2-201.
9. Id. at subsection (1).
10. Stern, supra note 2, at 391.
11. Adam R. Smart, Note. E-Sign Versus State Electronic Signature Law: The
Electronic Statutory Battleground, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 485 (2001).
12. Id. at 489.
13. Id. at 491.
14. Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-602 (1996).
15. Smart, supra note 11, at 491. See e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1-1633.17
(West 2000).
16. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) (1999) available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited January 12, 2003).
17. Stern, supra note 2, at 394.
18. Watson, supra note 3, at 807.
19. Id.
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nature of technology today, quick obsolescence is a given."
States sought to avoid the need for specific laws to be amended
every time new technology enters the market.
Although the NCCUSL's intent in enacting the UETA was
to foster uniformity in state technology laws,21 its proposal may
have had the contrary effect.2 2  Many states focused their ap-
proach on consumer protection, specifically, certain minimum
levels of security within electronic transactions, thus setting up
barriers to businesses trying to use this new technology to in-
crease sales.
One effect of the states adopting differing versions of the
UETA has created a tangled web of electronic signature laws
with which both businesses and consumers have to deal. 24 Since
the versatile nature of e-commerce lends itself to conducting in-
terstate business, consumers and sellers are faced with distin-
guishing and complying with the various state laws.25 Some
jurisdictions favor consumer protection. 26 Others are more pro-
business, 27 thus leading to forum selection clauses and the classic
problems of the battle of the forms, adhesion and unconsciona-
bility issues and rolling contracts.28
B. E-SIGN
To eliminate some of the confusion among states, Congress
passed the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Com-
20. Stern, supra note 2, at 406 (stating that the technology neutral approach of
the UETA is justified by the fact that technology tends to be obsolete) (Critics say
that the approach fosters the use of insecure procedures that make it easy for hack-
ers to commit fraud online.)
21. Watson, supra note 3, at 806.
22. P. Reed, supra note 4.
23. Almost 40 states have adopted their form of UETA to date.
24. Id. See also Robert MacMillan, Patchy State Laws Hamper E.Sign Rollout-
Witnesses, June 28, 2001, NEWSBYTES.COM. (Author maintains article on file.)
25. Id.
26. Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-491(b) (2000). Virginia's Code includes five extra fac-
tors to determine the evidentiary weight of an electronic signature. The factors are
whether the signature is unique to the signer, capable of verification, under the
signer's sole control, linked to the record in such a manner that it can be determined
if any data contained in the record was changed subsequent to the electronic signa-
ture being affixed to the record, and created by a method appropriately reliable for
the purpose for which the electronic signature was used.
27. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1633 (West 2002).
28. See U. C. C. § 2-207 (2000), and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3rd 1147
(7th Cir. (I11.), 1997).
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merce Act ("E-Sign" or "The Act").2 9 The policy objectives of
E-Sign are to provide a nationally uniform framework in which
to protect consumers and to foster the growth of e-commerce.3 °
E-Sign provides that an electronic signature is not invalid simply
because it is an electronic signature.3 The Act is largely based
on NCCUSL's proposal in that it does not "limit, alter, or other-
wise affect any requirement imposed by a statute, regulation, or
rule of law relating to the rights and obligations of persons ...
other than a requirement that contracts or other records be writ-
ten, signed, or in nonelectronic form."3 2
To further this policy objective, the Act requires the reten-
tion of "accurate" records (presumably achieved through print-
ing a hard copy). 33 If information relating to the transaction is to
be provided to the consumer in writing, an electronic record will
suffice as long as the consumer has "consented" to the electronic
transaction.34 For the consent to be valid, "a consumer must
have read a clear and conspicuous statement relating to the con-
sumer's choice and a confirmation of the consumer's ability to
receive information electronically.- 35 Clearly, the drafters of E-
Sign were concerned with protecting a consumer's rights in an
environment that is so susceptible to fraud.36
Moreover, E-Sign provides that certain topics are outside
the scope of valid electronic document transactions. 37 Common
sense dictates that instruments such as wills, codicils and testa-
mentary trusts are not valid under E-Sign. Family law documents
dealing with adoption and divorce also are not covered.38 Other
29. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001 et seq. (2002).
30. Watson, supra note 3, at 821.
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a) (1).
32. Id. at.§ 7001(b)(1).
33. Watson, supra note 3, at 814.
34. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(a).
35. Recent cases have drawn a careful distinction between different types of elec-
tronic clauses. Clickwrap acceptances are being upheld where the buyer can read
clear terms and affirmatively click "I accept" or "I agree." Compuserve, Inc. v. Pat-
terson, 86 F.3rd 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), America Online. Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423
(Fla. App. 2001). However, where terms and conditions are merely posted on a
website, and consent is "implied" (browsewraps), courts have refused enforcement.
America Online, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 90 Cal.App.4th 1 (2001) and Groff v. A.O.L., File
# P.C. 97-0331 (Rhode Island). The difference lies in the reasonableness of the ne-
gotiations, it appears.
36. Watson, supra note 3, at 815.
37. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003.
38. Id. at § 7003(a).
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exceptions include court orders, official government documents,
(e.g., filing Articles of Organization for a new Limited Liability
Company in California), notices of cancellation of utilities, evic-
tions, termination of health insurance and product recalls. Like-
wise, security agreements and financing statements under the
new Article 9 of the UCC must still be signed writings.3 9
The federal E-Sign officially allows states the option to
avoid preemption by either adopting their own UETA4° or im-
plementing an alternative law as long as it is consistent with the
provisions of E-Sign and does not require specific technology.4'
Since most electronic transactions involve interstate telecommu-
nications, federal jurisdiction most often governs, but some con-
tracts could be made through privately operated intrastate
networks, thus necessitating a UETA. If a state chooses not to
require specific technology, it must still make a specific reference
to E-Sign.42 Essentially, to be certain that no preemption will
take place, a state must enact a law that is identical to UETA.43
To date, no court has decided whether all of these modified state
laws are preempted by E-Sign. As a result, companies take a risk
when engaging in e-commerce in a state where the law does not
comport with E-Sign. 4
C. SECURITY UNDER E-SIGN
As defined by the E-Sign Act, an electronic signature is: "an
electronic sound, symbol or process, attached to or logically asso-
ciated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted
by a person with the intent to sign the record. ' 45 Further, an
electronic record is "a contract or other record created, gener-
ated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic
means.
46
There are several types and levels of security when signing a
contract online. The National Consumer Law Center has ad-
monished lawmakers that: "Given the current state of authenti-
39. Id. at § 7003(b).
40. Id. at § 7002(a).
41. Id.
42. Watson, supra note 3, at 819.
43. Sarah L. Roberts-Witt, Sign of the Times, PC MAGAZINE, April 23, 2002, at
69.
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006.
45. Id.
46. Reed, supra note 4.
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cation technology, it's much easier to forge or steal an e-
signature than a written one."47 But proponents of E-Sign state
that "digital signatures, by their very nature, are more secure and
provide a higher level of authenticity than a handwritten signa-
ture on a piece of paper ever could."4 8 Since there is a difference
of opinion on the relative security of digital signatures, it may be
useful to discern what each level of security entails and how to
attain the most secure signatures.
The simplest way to bind a consumer to a contract is by pro-
viding the terms, and then accepting the contract by clicking an
"I Agree" button.4 9 The next level in security is the "shared
secrets"5 method, which involves the use of passwords or credit
cards to establish the consumer's intent to be bound to the con-
tract.5' For example, if a consumer were to buy a pair of roller-
blades online, she would have to give her credit card number,
thus showing that she intends to be bound to the transaction.
The third level of security is through "biometric authentica-
tion."'5 2 This technique recognizes a fingerprint, an iris or a voice
to create a binding form of signature. It requires a sample to be
taken from a physiological characteristic of the consumer and
stored for comparison to access that user's profile. 54 To authenti-
cate the user, the previous profile is compared to the current user
and presumably a match occurs where the identity of the con-
sumer is verified.5 5 Several corporations now deal in the biomet-
ric authentication of a consumer's signature. They analyze the
"shape, speed, stroke order, off-tablet motion, pen pressure and
timing information" during signing.57  Such characteristics are
basically impossible to duplicate.
47. About.com, Sign Here Please (June 22,1998), available at http://net-
security.about.com/library/weekly/aa062298.htm (last visited January 12, 2003).
48. Stern, supra note 2, at 395.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 396.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 395.
55. Cyber-SIGN, The Legality of Electronic Signatures Using Cyber-Sign is Well
Established, available at http://www.cybersign.com/news news.htm. (Author main-
tains article on file.)
56. Id.
57. Id.
2002]
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The most complicated security procedure is the digital signa-
ture. Before the enactment of E-Sign, some states required this
high level of technology for a contract to be legally binding. 8 A
digital signature consists of a private key and a public key infra-
structure (PKI) which is distributed by a neutral third party,
called a Certification Authority (CA).59 When a consumer reads
a contract and signs it using either a PIN, a smart card, a finger-
print reader, or a digitized signature, the consumer is issued a
private key from the CA.6" The private key is used to turn the
contract, by way of a hashing algorithm, into a numerical code
called a digest.6" With that key, the digest is encrypted, and
binds the consumer's digital signature.62
The sender's public key travels with the document. When
the company receives the consumer's contract, it can be
decrypted using the consumer's public key.63 The hashing al-
gorithm produces another digest, which is compared to the origi-
nal digest. If the two digests match, then the signature has been
authenticated.64 A mismatch indicates that the document was
tampered with after it was signed .65 VeriSign,66 Entrust Author-
ity,6 7 MobileTrust, 68 and VaCert,69 are all companies that use
PKI's and are independent CA's to vouch for an individual's
identity. 70
This technology is quite sensitive and has been verified
under close scrutiny. 7 In one case, a user signed a document
with a digital signature and then erased one single period from
58. Roberts-Witt. supra note 43, at 68.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. About.corn, Sign Here Please, supra note 47.
65. VeriSign Authentication and PKI Solutions, available at http://www.ver-
isign.com (last visited January 12, 2003).
66. Entrust Authority, available at http://www.entrust.com (last visited January
12, 2003).
67. MobileTrust, available at http://www.certicom.com (last visited January 12,
2003).
68. ValiCert Trust Services, available at http://www.valicert.com (last visited Janu-
ary 12, 2003).
69. Roberts-Witt, supra note 43, at 71.
70. About.Corn, Sign Here Please, supra note 47.
71. Id.
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the document.72 When the tester opened the document a "bad
signature" message popped up. 73 The PKI can sense even the
slightest change in a document that does not match up between
the previous document and the current document.
Although the process does appear to be at a very high level
of security, there are always computer hackers looking to breach
security procedures.74 For example, computer hackers, many of
which are children (teenagers), have broken into high security
systems such as Microsoft, Amazon.com, e-bay, Yahoo, the FBI,
the United States Senate, the Defense Department, the White
House and NASA.7 5 If teenagers can break into these superior
security systems, then how secure is a digital signature against
this threat? The highest level of protection comes from a combi-
nation of security techniques. The strategy of using both biomet-
ric authentication and digital signatures ensures the best security
one can assume from electronic transactions up to date.
D. CONFLICTS OF LAWS
One of the major problems with E-Sign is its ambiguous fed-
eral preemption section that has become "particularly problem-
atic."7 6 Legislative history revealed in the early drafts of E-Sign
refers to concerns by the drafters over a "mind-numbing com-
plexity of preemption provisions and the uncertainties that they
raise with the Act's interface with ... UETA. ' 77
Since over 30 states have different laws on digital signatures,
it is unclear what is subject to preemption by E-Sign, and this will
remain a risk until each law is litigated. Hypothetically, each
state could have a different answer on whether their law is pre-
empted by E-Sign. One in-house counsel at a large insurance
company recently stated that: "I was very excited about the E-
SIGN Act when it passed. But once I worked through what was
in it ... well, just forget it."7"
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Jared Sommer, Note, Electronic Signatures and the UETA: E-Commerce in
an Insecure E-World, 37 IDAHo L. REV. 507, 521 (2001).
75. Id.
76. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste, Congress and the Common Law in
Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 362 (2002). See also MacMillan, supra note 24.
77. MacMilan, supra note 24.
78. Smart, supra note 11, at 499.
20021
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The "consistency test" to determine whether a state law will
be federally preempted by E-Sign is extremely nebulous, 79 creat-
ing the crux of the problem. It is unclear whether the preemp-
tion of E-Sign only applies to the non-conforming provisions or
the entire version of the UETA. If a state law is basically
modeled after the UETA, but with some additional language to
protect consumers, there are three opposing interpretations that
a court may utilize when determining federal preemption. 0
First, a court may find that the inconsistent non-uniform provi-
sions are invalid, but the remaining sections would remain valid.
Second, if there are any non-UETA provisions in the law, then
the whole law must be checked for consistency with the E-Sign
Act. Third, any non-uniform provision fails regardless of the
consistency test.8 ' It is impossible to tell how a court would rule
when faced with a state law that does not comport to the UETA.
Furthermore, no state thus far has enacted the exact version of
NCCUSL's UETA.
Another problem with E-Sign is that in practice there are
conflicting state laws on the subject of e-commerce. Each state
has adopted its own version of the UETA, and when transacting
online, it is impossible to tell in which state a consumer or busi-
ness is consenting to litigation. For example, California estab-
lished an electronic transactions law before the adoption of the
E-Sign Act.82
The CA-UETA differs from the UETA in four areas. In its
definition of electronic signatures, CA-UETA has more exclu-
sions regarding its scope and adds a provision addressing stan-
dard form consent contracts, electronic records and signatures in
reference to statements signed under the penalty of perjury.83
In comparison, New York's pre-E-Sign Act (Electronic Sig-
natures and Records Act - SRA), 4 is a non-UETA law. ESRA's
goal is to instill public confidence and to create fair technology
regulation. It specifies a higher standard for technology to be
79. Id. at 498-499.
80. Id. at 498.
81. CAL. CIV. CODE 1633.1-1633.17 (West 2002).
82. Smart, supra note 11, at 508.
83. Id at 509-510.
84. Mark Ustin & J. Kemp Hannon, The New Electronic Signatures and Records
Act, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1999, at 5. The New York legislature decided to create their
own model of the UETA.
85. Smart, supra note 11, at 516.
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used in a transaction by narrowing the definition of an electronic
signature.86 Also, ESRA allows for greater consumer protection
in the areas of record and consent.87 To implement ESRA, the
New York legislature also provides for the Office of Technology
(OFT) to oversee and administer the Act. California and New
York's version of electronic signature laws are plainly inconsis-
tent with one another.88 This is true of many other states, thus
causing the "litigation nightmare."89
As a result of this uncertainty in preemption and conflicting
state law, businesses and consumers are hesitant to form con-
tracts over the Internet in other forum selection clauses. 90 In a
Federal Trade Commission report published in June of 2001,
"companies and individuals affected by E-Sign need to observe
the law in application" before transacting in heavy e-com-
merce. 9' Congress' objective when enacting E-Sign was to foster
growth in e-commerce, but the opposite has occurred. The am-
biguous law stunts the potential consumer and business 92 by the
threat of expensive litigation.93
E. REMEDIES
One possible cure for uncertainty in the law is to provide for
an industry-wide standard regarding e-commerce. 94 Companies
are eager to begin transacting online with consumers without the
risk of litigation. 95 A group of financial services and e-commerce
companies recently joined together to form a voluntary model
Standards and Procedures for Electronic Records and Signatures
(SPeRS). 96 The drafting committee is comprised of "Adobe,
Dell Financial Services, Ernst & Young, Ford Motor Credit Com-
pany, FreddieMac, GE Capital Mortgage Corp., Intuit Inc.,
86. Id. at 516.
87. Id. at 517.
88. P. Reed, supra note 4.
89. MacMillan, supra note 24. See generally comment, Business Wire Inc., Con-
sumers Union Offers Tips Before You Sign Your Name on the Digital Line, Sept. 28,
2000, available at NEXIS, Lexis, News Group File. (Author maintains article on file.)
90. MacMillan, supra note 24.
91. Id.
92. Roberts-Witt, supra note 43, at 69.
93. Roy Mark, Council Developing Standards for Electronic Signatures, March
19, 2002, available at http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3411-994171 (last
visited January 12, 2003).
94. Roberts-Witt, supra note 43, at 69.
95. Mark, supra note 93.
96. Id.
2002]
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MassMutual Financial Group, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Wells
Fargo and Zions Bank/Digital Signature Trust," to name a few
companies.9" The drafters for SPeRS are incorporating legisla-
tion from several different areas of law including the UETA and
E-Sign.98 Although the standard may not be guaranteed to hold
up in court, at least companies can continue to transact with
other companies on certain industry-wide assumptions, thus cre-
ating custom in the trade.
Joining the effort for clarity in e-commerce legislation, on
May 1, 2002, LexisNexisTM announced a new Matthew Bender®
treatise on electronic commerce and communications by Stephen
Y. Chow, a principal authority on e-commerce.99 "E-Commerce
and Communications: Transactions in Digital Information" will
further elucidate the law on electronic signatures and incorporate
both the UETA and the Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act'00 (UCITA).1 °1 The treatise examines numerous top-
ics including but not limited to identity, privacy and security,
societal interests, transactions in digital information, trading on
the Internet, and digital signature." 2
IV. CONSUMER BURDENS, COMBATING FRAUD AND
ALLOCATING RISK
Yet another difficulty with the UETA and E-Sign is the in-
adequacy of the statutes regarding the possibility of fraud in elec-
tronic signatures. Countless computer hackers are waiting to
find the next new electronic security measure to breach. 10 3 With
this Security threat always looming, legislation needs to be en-
acted to afford the consumer greater protection against fraud.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. PR Newswire, May 1, 2002, available at LEXIS, Nexis library, PR Newswire
file. (Author maintains article on file.)
100. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, available at http://www.
cpsr.org/program/UCITA/ucita-fact.html [hereinafter UCITA] (last visited January
12, 2003). "UCITA is a [highly controversial] contract law statute that would apply
to computer software, multimedia products, computer data and databases, online
information, and other such products. It was designed to create a uniform commer-
cial contract law for these products and calls itself "a cyberspace commercial stat-
ute." It covers contracts that are generally known as "shrink-wrap licenses."
101. Id.
102. PR Newswire, supra note 99.
103. Robert Longley, E-Sign-Be Careful What You Ask For, July 23, 2000, availa-
ble at http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa072300a.htm (last visited January
12, 2003).
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One commentator posed the question, "After a careful reading
of the Digital Signatures Act, do you notice a warm-fuzzy feeling
that after e-signing your e-name you will be safe from e-theft, e-
fraud and e-forgery? Probable e-not."'1 4 He continues: "Be-
sides premeditated, intentional criminal abuse, consider the acci-
dental disasters that could come from e-signatures. With a click
of a mouse, your kid could sell your house, or, worse yet, buy you
10,000 shares of stock in a brand new digital signature software
company. ' 05
As of today, the UETA and E-Sign place the burden on the
consumer to prove that the fraud has occurred. 10 6 A major rea-
son why the adoption of E-Sign has not catalyzed an unimpeded
growth in e-commerce is that many consumers are not ready to
trust digital certificates and technology online10 7 without more
protection. 10 8
Electronic signatures are clearly in a separate category than
handwritten signatures, particularly regarding attribution. It is a
lot less expensive to prove that a handwritten signature is not
attributed to a consumer.'0 9 For a consumer to prove electronic
signature fraud, the consumer would have to hire a computer fo-
rensic expert to find the path of the hacker.'10 Companies now
specialize in providing services including investigating fraud, of-
fering testimony, and detecting faulty software. For a network
technician to complete onsite work, the cost can approach $100/
hr. (with no guarantee on how long the detection may take). 11'
By comparison, handwriting analysis experts average about $85
per sample.' 12
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Roberts-Witt, supra note 43, at 69.
107. Sommer, supra note 74, at 510.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Cybertrace Security Pricing available at http://www.cybertrace.com/pric-
ing.htm (last visited January 12, 2003). Compare Rehman Technology Services, Inc.
in Orlando specializes in forensic investigation for large companies. Their rates are
$250/hr for computer forensics and $475/hr for expert testimony, available at http://
www.surveil.com/rates.htm (last visited January 12, 2003).
111. See pricing at http://www.expertdocumentexaminer.com (last visited January
12, 2003) (price for handwriting analysis is $85) and http://www.myhandwriting.com/
experts (last visited January 12, 2003) (also $85).
112. Sommer, supra note 74, at 509.
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Consumers also have more trouble recognizing electronic
fraud versus handwritten fraud." 3 A hacker could use some-
one's identity to buy books on Amazon.com, but the innocent
consumer would not find out about this fraud until his next credit
card statement is received and examined. With handwriting
fraud, a consumer can usually differentiate between her own sig-
nature and someone else's forgery. Along with the innocent con-
sumer, a jury is able to inspect a handwritten forgery visually and
more readily determine whether a fraud has occurred.114 In the
case of the electronic signatures, the task for the jury is more
difficult.
Handwritten signatures also have a "ceremonial psychol-
ogy" surrounding the process that is lacking in electronic signa-
tures.1 1 5 There is a certain gravity when an individual signs a
binding contract, particularly in the presence of a notary and wit-
nesses, or with a seal of verification.' 16 The signer intends to be
bound by the transaction given the ritual nature of the signing.
For example, when signing the E-Sign Act, the President used a
smart card to sign the passing of the bill but also hand wrote a
signature on the bill." 7 Regardless of whether his latter act was
"just in case" or to make the bill "official," handwritten signa-
tures show apparent intent." 8 With electronic signatures, there
are usually no witnesses, no cameras and no notaries.11 9 The
''ceremonial" aspect of the fact that the consumer will be bound
by the document is lost. With one simple click of a button, an
action that any child could duplicate, the consumer may be
bound, regardless of intent.
UETA states that attribution is determined by "the act of
the person."1 2 ° Section 9 continues to state what the best evi-
dence 2 ' would be regarding attribution: The act of the person
may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy
of any security procedure applied to determine the person to
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Longley, supra at 105.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. UETA § 9.
120. Sommer, supra 74, at 520.
121. UETA § 9(a).
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which the electronic record or electronic signature was
attributable. 2
2
However, what happens is in the most common type of
fraud, where a hacker assumes the victim's identity, breaks into a
security system and manipulates the signature to maintain that it
is attributable to the victim's identity. 123 Under UETA, if the
security procedure is still intact and the signature still matches
with the victim, then the signature is attributable to the victim
and not the hacker.'24 Simply because a hacker abides by a se-
curity procedure does not mean that the signature is attributed to
the victim. 125 In countless scenarios hackers have stolen pass-
words or obtained secret keys to forge the victim's signature. 126
Under UETA, the fact that the security procedure has not been
breached on its face is enough to presume that the signature is
attributable to the victim. In this situation the consumer faces
two burdens. First, proof that a secure procedure was followed is
evidence against the innocent consumer. Second, the consumer
has the burden of proving that the signature was indeed a fraud.
Businesses are in a better position to take on the burden of
proving attribution of electronic signatures because they have the
ability to house more secure and reliable security systems. 127
Also, companies can set up systems to track trails left by hackers
and interveners in e-commerce.128 Businesses can allocate the
risk by incorporating the costs of such tasks to the consumer.
Consumers are usually willing to pay more for a product in ex-
change for greater consumer protection against fraud.
One suggestion is to use a third party. Certification Authori-
ties (CA's) are companies that distribute digital signatures by
offering PKI's (public key infrastructures). Since both the con-
sumer and the business pay the CA to guarantee security, the CA
should take on the burden of proving fraud once a consumer
identifies it.' 29 The CA is in the best position to trace a hacker
because CA's already have the technology and system require-
122. Michael Lee, Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for Legitimacy:
A Regulatory Proposal, 14, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 839, 848 (1999).
123. Sommer, supra note 74, at 521.
124. Id. at 518-519.
125. Lee, supra note 122.
126. Sommer, supra note 74 at 520.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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ments to trail possible hackers. It is comparatively easy for a CA
to hire a few forensic experts to track fraud. CA's can allocate
the risk by passing the extra cost to the consumer.1 30 In addition,
putting the burden on the CA will put a challenge out to any
company interested in dominating the market to introduce the
most secure technology there is to guarantee no breaches of se-
curity. The CA with the most secure procedures will have a great
amount to gain since the demand is high for secure methods of
transacting online. Putting the burden on the third party serves
the goal of E-Sign because it facilitates growth in e-commerce by
fostering an atmosphere of healthy competition.
V. CONCLUSION
The potential market for e-commerce and electronic signa-
tures is virtually unlimited. 3' Companies are enthusiastic about
switching to a digital age where they can eliminate paper and also
reduce work time. To illustrate, Network Telephone recently de-
cided to switch to electronic signatures to meet the growing de-
mands of its customers. The results have far surpassed the
expectations from the company. 32 GMAC Commercial Mort-
gage also made the switch and boasts an increase in its portfolio
by $35 billion.1 33 Documents that typically required weeks to
complete were done in a matter of hours. The payoff for switch-
ing to electronic signatures is huge, but there is a calculated
amount of risk involved.
Switching to an electronic standard is certainly achievable.
Purchasing products and services online is an efficient and desir-
able method to transact business. Nevertheless, the law in the
areas of e-commerce and electronic signatures needs to be more
definitive as to consumer fraud and provide uniformity and pre-
dictability among courts. Companies and individuals should not
have to fear potential litigation simply because the available stat-
utes are broad and ambiguous. As with any other new area of
law, cases will have to arise before the law will be perfected. In-
terested parties are hoping for sooner rather than later.
130. Lee, supra note 122, at 840.
131. Roberts-Witt, supra note 43, at 66.
132. Id. at 69.
133. Id.
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